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We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of
markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. As orthodox
theory would predict, we ﬁnd that providing buyers with information about sellers’ trading
history boosts market performance. More surprisingly, this beneﬁcial effect of incentives for
reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers’ trading
history. This suggests that two-sided market transparency is an important ingredient for the
design of well-functioning markets that are prone to moral hazard. (JEL: C72, C91, L14)
1. Introduction
Reputationbuildinginrepeatedtrustgamesrequiresthattrustorshavesomeinfor-
mation about trustees’ behaviour in the past. Consider a buyer–seller framework
where sequential exchange induces a moral hazard problem. First, buyers make a
decision about whether or not to send some money to a seller who has advertised
a good. After having received the money, the seller then decides whether or not
to deliver the promised good. In such a market a seller can build up a reputation
for being honest if and only if buyers can at least partially observe the seller’s
trading history.
Thus, providing buyers with information about sellers’ past should help to
alleviate the moral hazard problem. We shall call such feedback provision to
buyers one-sided market transparency. The ﬁrst result that we establish in this
paper is that it indeed helps to improve efﬁciency in laboratory markets that
suffer from moral hazard. However, our key ﬁnding is that two-sided market
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transparencywhereboth,buyersandsellers,haveaccesstosellers’tradinghistory
improves market performance even further. From the vantage point of orthodox
theory, this is a surprising result. Whether or not sellers can observe other sellers’
past should be irrelevant. But as we conclusively show, it is not.
The key to understanding this result is very simple. There are some sellers
who, when left to their own devices, simply do not understand the mechanics
of reputation building. In markets with one-sided transparency only, they make
use of any opportunity to rip off their customers despite the drastic consequences
this implies for their reputation. Typically, it does not take long until such sellers
establish a ﬁrm reputation as cheats and lose all business. This is different in
markets with two-sided transparency because here sellers can learn from other
sellers. In particular, sellers who initially do not understand the incentives for
reputation building can now observe others who do. And they can see that those
who do, get more business and are soon much better off than they are. Given a
second chance, they can now imitate successful reputation building. This process
of social learning gave this paper its title.
While the beneﬁts of one-sided market transparency have already been doc-
umented in the literature,1 the interaction of social learning and reputation incen-
tives that makes two-sided transparency superior in our experiment has, to the
best of our knowledge, not been demonstrated before.2 Of course, the often cited
example of eBay’s feedback mechanism is one that implements two-sided trans-
parency. On eBay, everybody, buyers and sellers, has access to information about
sellers’ histories. However, previous studies have—probably guided by ortho-
doxreasoning—ignoredtheroleofprovidingsellerswithinformationabouteach
other. Our results suggest that, in fact, two-sided transparency is an important
ingredient for the design of well-functioning markets that are prone to moral
hazard.
2. Experimental Design and Procedures
Inourexperiments,subjectsplaythebinary-choicetrustgameshowninFigure1.
Payoffs are in pence and strategies and player roles are labeled exactly as in the
experiment. Assuming that players maximise some monotone function of their
monetarypayoffandthatthisiscommonknowledge,thegamehasauniqueNash
equilibrium,inwhichtheﬁrstmoverchooses“X”,i.e.,nottotrust,andthesecond
mover chooses “left”, i.e., not to honour trust if being trusted. In the following
we will refer to the ﬁrst mover as the buyer and to the second mover as the seller.
1. See, for example, Keser (2002), Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2004), or Bohnet and Huck
(2004).
2. Studies that show how subjects can learn from other subjects to improve their decision making
in other contexts include Offerman and Sonnemans (1998) and Slembeck and Tyran (2004).“zwu0221” — 2005/5/21 — page 324 — #3
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Figure 1. The trust game.
Payoffs are deliberately chosen to be asymmetric in order to make the moral
hazard problem as difﬁcult as possible.3 Subjects play this game in all treatments
for 30 periods. Keeping their roles they are randomly rematched at the start of
each period. Each matching group consists of four sellers and four buyers.
The treatments differ in what subjects know about the past. In the baseline
treatment, NoInfo, subjects have no information about the past. Whenever they
are rematched, they are simply told “You have been rematched with a new par-
ticipant” without knowing anything about this participant’s identity or history. In
all other treatments sellers can be identiﬁed with labels (B1, B2, B3, and B4). In
treatment Reputation, all buyers know all sellers’ pasts. In treatment Imitation
allsellersknoweachother’spast.And,ﬁnally,intreatment Two-Sidedboth,sell-
ers and buyers, can observe all sellers’ pasts.4 This 2 × 2 design is summarised
in Table 1.
The experiments were computerised5 and sellers’ histories were made avail-
able using a simple graphical tool. In the left part of the screen subjects could see
Table 1. The 2×2 design.
Sellers know sellers’ histories
No Yes
Buyers know No NoInfo Imitation
Sellers’ histories Yes Reputation Two-Sided
3. With symmetric payoffs after honoured trust (Y, right) subjects ﬁnd it much easier to achieve
efﬁciency already in one-shot games, see, for example, Bacharach, Guerra, and Zizzo (2001) or
Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2004).
4. In each treatment, the information structure is publicly known. For example, in Reputation,
both, buyers and sellers know that buyers can observe sellers’ pasts while sellers cannot.
5. We used Fischbacher’s (1999) z-tree.“zwu0221” — 2005/5/21 — page 325 — #4
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Table 2. Average honour, trust, and efﬁciency rates in all four
treatments.
NoInfo Reputation Imitation Two-Sided
Honour rate 0.19 0.44 0.19 0.62
(0.11) (0.26) (0.16) (0.23)
Trust rate 0.21 0.31 0.14 0.43
(0.15) (0.17) (0.11) (0.15)
Efﬁciency rate 0.05 0.17 0.04 0.29
(0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.18)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
four columns consisting of 30 hash signs, each column representing one seller.
Each row represented one period. Initially, all hash signs were white. Then, after
each period, hash signs in the row representing this period changed their colour.
They turned black if the seller had not to make a decision because his buyer did
not trust him. They turned green if the seller honoured the buyer’s trust. And
they turned red if the seller exploited the buyer’s trust. This colour coding is,
of course, obvious and makes it rather easy to read the comparatively complex
history information.
TheexperimentswereconductedattheUniversityofLondon.Foreachofthe
four treatments we conducted six separate sessions, each with eight subjects who
had been recruited via e-mails to the college’s entire student body. Altogether,
192 subjects participated in the experiments, which lasted on average less than
an hour. Average earnings were £11.07 (including a £5 show-up fee).
3. Results
3.1. A Static View
Table2shows,foreachtreatment,averagehonourrates,i.e.,theaveragefrequency
with which sellers honour buyers’ trust, average trust rates, i.e., the average fre-
quency with which buyers trust sellers, and, ﬁnally, average efﬁciency rates, i.e.,
the average frequency with which subjects play (Y, right) and reach the individ-
ually rational efﬁcient outcome (which, from here on, we shall simply call the
“efﬁcientoutcome”orrefertoitas“efﬁcienttrade”).6 Figures2,3,and4showthe
same information graphically and, in addition, honour, trust, and efﬁciency rates
for, both, the best and the worst session in each treatment. A few observations are
in order.
1. Intreatmentswithoutincentivesforreputationbuilding(NoInfoandImitation)
honour rates are very low (below 20%) and so are trust rates. Consequently,
there is hardly any efﬁcient trade.
6. Noticethatthesumofpayoffsisequalinbothendnodesthatcanbereachedaftertheﬁrstmover
decision to trust. Again, this is a feature that makes it harder for subjects to cooperate. See also
footnote 3.“zwu0221” — 2005/5/21 — page 326 — #5
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Figure 2. Honour rates in all treatments.
2. Introducing incentives for reputation building in treatment Reputation more
than doubles the average honour rate, which also boosts the trust rate. As a
resultthenumberofefﬁcienttradesismorethantripled.However,thereiscon-
siderablevariancebetweensessionsandtheoveralloutcomeisfarfromperfect.
3. The reputation effects are considerably enhanced in treatment Two-Sided
where both, buyers and sellers, have access to sellers’ trading history. Again,
there are considerable differences between sessions.
Conducting statistical tests7 reveals that the effects of introducing incentives
for reputation building are highly signiﬁcant.8 However, despite the consistently
Figure 3. Trust rates in all treatments.
7. We always take one session as one independent observation and then perform pairwise MWU-
tests with six against six observations.
8. Comparing NoInfo with Reputation we ﬁnd that, both, honour and efﬁciency rates are signiﬁ-
cantlyhigherinthelatter(one-sidedp = 0.023andp = 0.074,respectively).ComparingImitation“zwu0221” — 2005/5/21 — page 327 — #6
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Figure 4. Efﬁciency rates in all treatments.
higheraveragesintreatment Two-Sided,testsfailtoshowanysigniﬁcantbeneﬁts
of two-sided market transparency. Comparing treatments Reputation and Two-
Sided,w eﬁ n dno signiﬁcant differences—neither for honour rates, nor for trust
and efﬁciency rates. Does this mean that there are indeed no effects of added
markettransparencyandthat,asorthodoxtheorypredicts,itonlymatterswhether
or not buyers can observe sellers? In the next subsection we shall argue that this
conclusion would be premature.
3.2. A Dynamic View
Two-sided market transparency has the advantage that sellers who do not under-
stand the mechanics of reputation building can learn from other sellers who do. If
such learning is important one would predict that two-sided transparency crowds
in honour, trust, and efﬁciency over time.9 To test for such dynamic effects we
will, therefore, analyse a very simple measure capturing the market dynamics.
For each session we shall compute the difference between the average honour
(trust/efﬁciency) rate over time and the initial honour (trust/efﬁciency) rate. In
the case of trust and efﬁciency, these initial rates are simply computed for the ﬁrst
round. This approach does not work for initial honour rates since there are many
sellers who do not have to make a decision in their ﬁrst round. Hence to compute
initial honour rates, we take for each seller the ﬁrst instance where he or she had
a decision to make.10 Table 3 shows the differences between average and initial
rates for all four treatments.
and Two-Sided reveals that all three rates are higher when buyers know sellers’ history (p = 0.005
for trust, p = 0.008 for honour, and p = 0.004 for efﬁciency).
9. Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) provide a theoretical model for crowding in of trustworthiness.
10. Notice that these measures, while somewhat crude, are extremely clean. In particular, more
sophisticated measures for the initial propensities to trust or honour would unavoidably be“zwu0221” — 2005/5/21 — page 328 — #7
328 Journal of the European Economic Association
Table 3. Crowding effects in all four treatments.
NoInfo Reputation Imitation Two-Sided
Honour crowding effect 0.11 0.05 0.19 0.33
(0.17) (0.31) (0.16) (0.49)
Trust crowding effect −0.04 −0.06 −0.03 0.22
(0.11) (0.28) (0.15) (0.26)
Efﬁciency crowding effect 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.20
(0.07) (0.21) (0.04) (0.23)
Note: Crowding effect is computed as average rate minus initial rate. (Standard deviations in paren-
theses.) Notice that the honour crowding effect in treatment Imitation is due to an initial honour
rate of zero.
Thetablerevealsratherdramaticeffectsoftwo-sidedtransparency.Theaver-
age honour rate is 33 percentage points higher than the initial rate. This basically
amounts to one-third of the seller population learning that building up a good
reputation pays. Put differently, it amounts to every third seller turning from a
cheat into a reliable trading partner.
In treatment Reputation there is also a slight increase in honour rates but,
the effect is both, smaller and without consequences for overall market perfor-
mance. Under two-sided market transparency increasing honour rates translate
into increasing trust and, hence, increasing efﬁciency rates. In treatment Two-
Sided overall efﬁciency is 20 percentage points higher than initial efﬁciency
while in all other treatments efﬁciency does virtually not change over time.
Not surprisingly, these dynamic effects of two-sided market transparency are
not only strong in size but also highly signiﬁcant. A comparison of treatments
Reputation and Two-Sided tests for the additional beneﬁt of sellers observing
other sellers in the presence of incentives for reputation building. Pairwise tests
reveal that all three crowding effects are signiﬁcantly higher in Two-Sided than
in Reputation.11 Thus, we see that two-sided market transparency has indeed
an important beneﬁcial effect for market performance that could not have been
predicted by orthodox theory.
4. Conclusion
We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the per-
formance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequen-
tial exchange. We ﬁnd that, as orthodox theory predicts, providing buyers with
information about sellers’ trading history boosts market performance. With such
confounded with learning or other dynamic effects. Also, by taking simply one dynamic measure
we avoid making any assumptions about the functional form of the dynamics.
11. The p-values are p = 0.055 for the crowding in of trust and honour and p = 0.075 for the
crowding in of efﬁciency (one-sided MWU-tests).“zwu0221” — 2005/5/21 — page 329 — #8
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one-sided market transparency sellers have an incentive to build up a reputation
as reliable trading partners and many sellers use this opportunity, which helps to
alleviate moral hazard. This beneﬁcial effect of incentives for reputation building
is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers’ trading history.
Apparently some sellers do not understand the mechanics of reputation building
ontheirown.However,withtwo-sidedmarkettransparencythesesellerscanlearn
from those who manage to build a good reputation. Thus, there is a systematic
learning process turning sellers who initially cheat into reliable trading partners.
This dramatically increases market performance over time.
This result adds to the existing literature on feedback information, some of
which has been motivated by the success of eBay’s celebrated feedback mecha-
nism. It suggests that eBay beneﬁts from having sellers’ feedback rating freely
availabletobothmarketsides.Whilethiswasperhapsaverynaturaldesignchoice
for eBay where people act as both, buyers and sellers, this might be less obvious
for specialised trading and procurement platforms where the two market sides
are more separated. Here two-sided transparency might be a less obvious but—as
our ﬁndings suggest—very recommendable choice.
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